人大经济论坛

 找回密码
 立即注册

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

搜索
热搜: 活动 交友 discuz
查看: 178|回复: 10

[推荐]契约 -行为-组织

[复制链接]
发表于 2005-8-8 10:44:00 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
<>Menezes, Flavio M. , Australian National University
Monteiro, Paulo K. , Escola de Pós-Gradua&ccedil;&atilde;o em Economia da FGV
An Introduction to Auction Theory
Print ISBN 019927598X, 2004

Abstract: This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory. </P>




<P>Keywords: auction theory, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Revenue Equivalence Theorem, multiple objects, private values model, common values model, affiliated values model

Table of Contents
Preface

1. Introduction

2. Preliminaries

3. Private values

4. Common value

5. Affiliated values

6. Mechanism Design

7. Multiple Objects

Appendix

Bibliography

Index
</P>
<P><a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/019927598X/toc.html" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#000000>http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/019927598X/toc.html</FONT></A></P>
<P>Athens users可以全文阅读</P>
[此贴子已经被作者于2005-8-8 11:30:12编辑过]
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 10:51:00 | 显示全部楼层
<>Auction Theory
by Vijay Krishna     

Table of Contents  
  
1. Introduction 1
  
Part I.        Single Object Auctions 10
  
2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look                                        13
     2.1 The Symmetric Model                        
     2.2 Second-Price Auctions   
  
     2.3 First-Price Auctions
  
     2.4 Revenue Comparison         
  
     2.5 Reserve Prices
  
3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle 29
     3.1 Main Result  
     3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle   
4. Qualifications and Extensions 37
     4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders  
     4.2 Budget Constraints  
     4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders  
     4.4 Resale and Efficiency  
5. Mechanism Design 61
     5.1 Mechanisms  
     5.2 Optimal Mechanisms  
     5.3 Efficient Mechanisms  
6. Auctions with Interdependent Values 83
     6.1 The Symmetric Model  
     6.2 Second-Price Auctions  
     6.3 English Auctions  
     6.4 First-Price Auctions  
     6.5 Revenue Comparisons  
     6.6 Efficiency  
7. The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage”) Principle                                       103
     7.1 The Main Result  
     7.2 Public Information  
     7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle  
8. Asymmetries and Other Complications                                                 111
     8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle  
     8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions  
     8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders  
     8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees  
9. Efficiency and the English Auction                                                      125
     9.1 The Single Crossing Condition  
     9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions  
     9.3 The Average Crossing Condition  
     9.4 Three or More Bidders  
     9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2  
     9.6 Miscellany  
10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values 141
     10.1 Efficient Mechanisms  
     10.2 Optimal Mechanisms  
11. Bidding Rings                                                                                       151  
     11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions  
     11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions  
  
Part II.      Multiple Object Auctions                                                     163  
  
12. An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions 165
     12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Multiple Units  
     12.2 Some Open Auctions  
13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values 179
     13.1 The Basic Model  
     13.2 Vickrey Auctions  
     13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions  
     13.4 Uniform Price Auctions  
     13.5 Discriminatory Auctions  
14. Some Revenue Considerations 199
     14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions  
     14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example  
15. Sequential Sales 209
     15.1 Sequential First-Price Auctions  
     15.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions  
16. Nonidentical Objects 223
     16.1 The Model  
     16.2 Efficient Allocations  
     16.3 Substitutes and Complements  
     16.4 Bundling  
     16.5 Some Computational Issues  
     16.6 Budget Constraints  
17. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values 235  
     17.1 One Dimensional Signals  
     17.2 Multidimensional Signals  
  
Part III.     Appendices                                                                             251
  
A. Continuous Distributions
253  
B. Stochastic Orders                                                                                   
259  
C. Order Statistics
265  
D. Affiliated Random Variables
269  
E. Some Linear Algebra
273  
F. Games of Incomplete Information                                                        
279
G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions                                
283
  
References                                                                                                                              
   289
Index   299 </P>
<P>  <a href="http://econ.la.psu.edu/~vkrishna/book.htm" target="_blank" >http://econ.la.psu.edu/~vkrishna/book.htm</A></P>

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-8-8 10:53:15编辑过]
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 10:56:00 | 显示全部楼层
<DIV class=buying><FONT size=3><B>Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (Econometric Society Monographs) (Paperback)</B>
</FONT>by <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&amp;field-author-exact=Alvin%20E.%20Roth/102-2616245-5199317" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399>Alvin E. Roth</FONT></A>, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&amp;field-author-exact=Marilda%20A.%20Oliveira%20Sotomayor/102-2616245-5199317" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399>Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor</FONT></A>, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&amp;field-author-exact=Andrew%20Chesher/102-2616245-5199317" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399>Andrew Chesher</FONT></A> (Series Editor), <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books&amp;field-author-exact=Matthew%20Jackson/102-2616245-5199317" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399>Matthew Jackson</FONT></A> (Series Editor) <FONT size=1>"In these chapters we will examine in detail the two-sided matching market without money that arises each agent may be matched with (at most) one..." (</FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0521437881/ref=sib_fs_top/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;p=S00U&amp;checkSum=r2p2FtWTIfkng80CN%2B5%2BQQKP%2FnHFlRZBq49Izv%2BRg2I%3D#reader-link" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>more</FONT></A><FONT size=1>)</FONT>
<FONT size=1><b>SIPs:</b> </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=sip_top_0/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=p%2B2LvjSlmg7tUwrtfLE6E9zmemY6hR4UqDg5ubIKpBxBS5TFWBkKmA%3D%3D&amp;phrase=college%20admissions%20model" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>college admissions model</FONT></A><FONT size=1>, </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=sip_top_1/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=%2BmeooGgCRPvPXGXUa4sRES267kBKqSGw8zjciBQREcpAx3fCtY%2FfOmvYWLIz0LLC&amp;phrase=deferred%20acceptance%20algorithm" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>deferred acceptance algorithm</FONT></A><FONT size=1>, </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=sip_top_2/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=5Oug3NXYP%2F1JbNGlX2%2F033BU9wcwh98XUTyYimBbbuZUTFw6WNAbVw%3D%3D&amp;phrase=optimal%20stable%20matchings" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>optimal stable matchings</FONT></A><FONT size=1>, </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=sip_top_3/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=lr4OmS35IitdbAWQI32Xqc6GsAHyo5lM%2Bsr7O%2F0jHKc%3D&amp;phrase=pairwise%20stable" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>pairwise stable</FONT></A><FONT size=1>, </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=sip_top_4/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=bC8HNeMiXHDM8KnSUXiFHg6WHWVFBkXCBF9NYIp9yZE%3D&amp;phrase=two%20stable%20matchings" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>two stable matchings</FONT></A><FONT size=1> (</FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521437881/102-2616245-5199317?v=glance#sipbody" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#996633 size=1>more</FONT></A><FONT size=1>)
<b>CAPs:</b> </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=cap_top_0/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=0fdh6sSJTTQ7mJ1%2BVZFEim7WFmdA%2BhVTlXkaOjfqMgw%3D&amp;phrase=United%20Kingdom" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>United Kingdom</FONT></A><FONT size=1>, </FONT><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/phrase/ref=cap_top_1/102-2616245-5199317?%5Fencoding=UTF8&amp;src=0521437881&amp;checkSum=ZD6QN4IeI9gL2iblpke%2FCDzdB%2FlNzbv6ctrJYihTFf8%3D&amp;phrase=Naval%20Academy" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#003399 size=1>Naval Academy</FONT></A><FONT size=1> </FONT>
</DIV>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 10:59:00 | 显示全部楼层
<><b><FONT size=3>Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis </FONT></b></P><P><b><FONT size=3>国图有收藏</FONT></b></P><P><B><FONT face="Times New Roman"><FONT size=+0>Econ 2056 and Business 2150: Market Design</FONT></FONT></B> <P><B><FONT face="Times New Roman"><FONT size=+0>Professors <a href="http://www.people.hbs.edu/ecantillon/" target="_blank" >Estelle Cantillon</A> and <a href="http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html" target="_blank" >Alvin E. Roth</A>, Spring 2004</FONT></FONT></B> <P><B><FONT face="Times New Roman"><FONT size=+0>Fridays, 9am-noon in Littauer M-16</FONT></FONT></B></P><P><a href="http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2056/Syllabus/MarketdesignRL2004.htm" target="_blank" >http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2056/Syllabus/MarketdesignRL2004.htm</A></P><P><a href="http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html" target="_blank" ><b><FONT face="Times New Roman">Alvin E. Roth</FONT></b></A>的学生:<a href="http://www.people.hbs.edu/mostrovsky/" target="_blank" >Michael Ostrovsky</A> is one of Harvard's star theory graduates this year, and he has a great paper on matching</P>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 11:08:00 | 显示全部楼层
Contract Theory
<a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/default.asp?aid=5819" target="_blank" >atrick Bolton</A> and <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/default.asp?aid=4224" target="_blank" >Mathias Dewatripont</A>

<P><a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=10275&amp;mode=toc" target="_blank" ><img src="http://mitpress.mit.edu/images/interface/orange_arrow.gif"> Table of Contents and Sample Chapters</A></P><P>Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.

The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of <I>The Journal of the European Economic Association</I>.

Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Adanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). </P><P><a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=10275" target="_blank" >http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=10275</A></P><P><a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/author/default.asp?aid=5819" target="_blank" >Patrick Bolton</A> 个人主页:http://www.princeton.edu/~pbolton/</P><P>提供大量个人论文下载
</P>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 11:11:00 | 显示全部楼层
The Economics of Contracts
A Primer
Bernard Salanié
<>Although it is one of the major achievements in the history of economic thought, the general equilibrium model is not completely satisfactory as a descriptive tool. In the 1970s several economists settled on a new way to study economic relationships that is often called the "economics of information." The theory of contracts is one of its main building blocks.</P><P>The theory of contracts uses partial equilibrium models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined institutional settings. The models sum up the constraints imposed by the prevailing institutional setting through a contract, either explicit or implicit. They make intensive use of noncooperative game theory with asymmetric information. </P><P>The Economics of Contracts introduces graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts. It grew out of a course Professor Salanié gave to third-year Stanford graduate students and third-year students at the Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l''Administration Economique. The book focuses on the methods used to analyze the models, but also discusses a few of the many applications the theory has generated in various fields of economics. The author''s goal is to give readers the basic tools to create their own applications.</P><P>Bernard Salanié is Research Fellow of LEI (CREST) in Paris, Professor at &Eacute;cole Polytechnique, and Managing Editor of the Review of Economic Studies. His books include The Microeconomics of Market Failures (2000) and The Economics of Taxation (2003), both published by The MIT Press. </P><P><a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=6958" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#000000>http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=6958</FONT></A></P>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 11:13:00 | 显示全部楼层
<>Putting Auction Theory to Work</P><P>This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of ‘optimal auctions’ and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.</P><P>
&#8226; Author is the world’s leading active scholar on auctions, internationally celebrated for his research on auction design</P><P>
&#8226; The most comprehensive and up-to-date book on the subject; author answers his critics in the literature</P><P>
&#8226; A must-buy for graduate students</P><P><a href="http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521536723" target="_blank" >http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521536723</A></P><P><U>milgrom个人主页: </U><a href="http://www.milgrom.net/" target="_blank" ><FONT color=#000000>www.milgrom.net</FONT></A></P>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 11:23:00 | 显示全部楼层
< align=center><FONT size=6><FONT size=5>Auctions: Theory and Practice</FONT></FONT><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/16MayCoverSheet.asp" target="_blank" > </A>
<EM>The Toulouse Lectures in Economics</EM></P><P align=center><FONT size=3>Paul Klemperer</FONT>
Nuffield College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
<a href="http://www.paulklemperer.org/" target="_blank" >http://www.paulklemperer.org</A>

This draft – mostly May 2003
published, <EM>Princeton University Press</EM>, 2004 (click <a href="http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7728.html" target="_blank" >here</A> for details or to purchase) <P>       This book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics. It can be used for a graduate course on auction theory, or – by picking selectively – an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design.
       Part I introduces the basic theory. Part II shows how modern auction-theoretic tools illuminate a range of mainstream economic questions that are superficially unconnected with auctions. Part III discusses practical auction design. Part IV describes the one-hundred-billion dollar 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices.
       The material was presented as the inaugural (2003) <EM>Toulouse Lectures in Economics</EM> and published by <EM>Princeton University Press</EM>.</P><BLOCKQUOTE><P><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/preface.pdf" target="_blank" ><EM>Preface</EM></A>
<a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/introduction_new.pdf" target="_blank" ><EM>Introduction</EM></A>  </P></BLOCKQUOTE><TABLE width="75%" border=0><TR><TD width="13%">I.</TD><TD colSpan=2>INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY </TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD width="9%">A</TD><TD width="78%"><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/Survey.pdf" target="_blank" >A Survey of Auction Theory</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>B</TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/Part1B.pdf" target="_blank" >Afterword</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>C</TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/Part1C.pdf" target="_blank" >Exercises (with solutions)</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD colSpan=2> </TD></TR></TABLE><TABLE width="75%" border=0><TR><TD width="14%">II</TD><TD colSpan=2>APPLICATIONS TO OTHER AREAS OF ECONOMICS</TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD width="8%">A </TD><TD width="78%"><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/WhyEveryEconomist.pdf" target="_blank" >Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>B </TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/Part2B.pdf" target="_blank" >Afterword</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD colSpan=2> </TD></TR></TABLE><TABLE width="75%" border=0><TR><TD width="14%">III. </TD><TD colSpan=2>PRACTICAL AUCTION DESIGN</TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD width="9%">A </TD><TD width="77%"><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/wrm6.pdf" target="_blank" >What Really Matters in Auction Design</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>B </TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/usingandabusing.pdf" target="_blank" >Using and Abusing Auction Theory</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD colSpan=2> </TD></TR></TABLE><TABLE width="75%" border=0><TR><TD width="14%">IV.</TD><TD colSpan=2>CASE STUDY – THE 3G MOBILE-PHONE AUCTIONS</TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD width="9%">A </TD><TD width="77%"><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/hownot.pdf" target="_blank" >Overview of the European Auctions</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>B </TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/biggestpaper.pdf" target="_blank" >Designing the UK Auction</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>C </TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/TOTALPDFBRITISH7GERMAN.pdf" target="_blank" >Bidder Strategies</A></TD></TR><TR><TD> </TD><TD>D </TD><TD><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/Part4D.pdf" target="_blank" >Were Auctions a Good Idea?</A> </TD></TR></TABLE><TABLE width="75%" border=0><TR><TD><FONT size=2> </FONT></TD><TD><FONT size=2> </FONT></TD><TD><FONT size=2> </FONT></TD></TR></TABLE><TABLE width="83%" border=0><TR><TD width="65%"><EM><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/SuggestionsforCourseOutlines.pdf" target="_blank" >Suggestions for Course Outlines</A> </EM></TD></TR></TABLE><a href="http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/VirtualBookCoverSheet.asp" target="_blank" >http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/VirtualBook/VirtualBookCoverSheet.asp</A>
 楼主| 发表于 2005-8-8 11:28:00 | 显示全部楼层
<H2 align=center>References on Contract Theory </H2><HR><H3 align=left><A>Working Papers</A> </H3><><a href="http://obata.misc.hit-u.ac.jp/~itoh/ctref03.html" target="_blank" >Recent Working Papers on Contract Theory and Organizational Economics</A> (October 29, 2004) </P><H3 align=left><A>Books</A> </H3><UL><LI>Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?sid=17DE028D-7A1B-4AF9-A1BC-9FCC7EE7F528&amp;ttype=2&amp;tid=10275" target="_blank" ><EM>Contract Theory</EM></A>. <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/" target="_blank" >The MIT Press</A>, January 2005. <LI>E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds.): <a href="http://titles.cambridge.org/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521814901" target="_blank" ><EM>The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications</EM></A>. <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/" target="_blank" >Cambridge University Press</A>, 2002. <LI><a href="http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hart/hart.html" target="_blank" >O. Hart</A>: <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/?view=usa&amp;ci=0198288816" target="_blank" ><EM>Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure</EM> </A>(<a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/series/ClarendonLecturesinEconomics/?view=usa" target="_blank" >Clarendon Lectures in Economics</A>). <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/?view=usa" target="_blank" >Oxford University Press</A>, 1995. <LI>J.-J. Laffont: <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262121360" target="_blank" ><EM>The Economics of Uncertainty and Information</EM></A>. <a href="http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/" target="_blank" >The MIT Press</A>, 1989. <LI>J.-J. Laffont: <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/?view=usa&amp;ci=0199248680" target="_blank" ><EM>Incentives and Political Economy</EM></A> (<a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/series/ClarendonLecturesinEconomics/?view=usa" target="_blank" >Clarendon Lectures in Economics</A>). <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/?view=usa" target="_blank" >Oxford University Press</A>, 2000. <LI>J.-J. Laffont and <a href="http://idei.fr/vitae.php?i=46" target="_blank" >D. Martimort</A>: <a href="http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7311.html" target="_blank" ><EM>The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model</EM></A>. <a href="http://pup.princeton.edu/" target="_blank" >Princeton University Press</A>, 2002.
<LI>J.-J. Laffont and <a href="http://idei.fr/vitae.php?i=3" target="_blank" >J. Tirole</A>: <a href="http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262121743" target="_blank" ><EM>A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation</EM></A>. <a href="http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/" target="_blank" >The MIT Press</A>, 1993. <LI><a href="http://hotelling.uab.es/~Ines/" target="_blank" >I. Macho-Stadler</A> and <a href="http://hotelling.uab.es/~David/" target="_blank" >D. Perez-Castrillo</A>: <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/?view=usa&amp;ci=0199243255" target="_blank" ><EM>An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Second Edition</EM></A>. <a href="http://www.oup.com/us/?view=usa" target="_blank" >Oxford University Press</A>, 2001. <LI><a href="http://www.milgrom.net/" target="_blank" >P. Milgrom</A> and <a href="http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/roberts/" target="_blank" >J. Roberts</A>: <a href="http://vig.prenhall.com/catalog/academic/product/1,4096,0132246503,00.html" target="_blank" ><EM>Economics, Organization and Management</EM></A>. <a href="http://vig.prenhall.com/" target="_blank" >Prentice-Hall</A>, 1992. (Go to <a href="http://www.nttpub.co.jp/vbook/list/detail/536.html" target="_blank" >Japanese translation</A>.) <LI>B. Salanie: <a href="http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262193868" target="_blank" ><EM>The Economics of Contracts: A Primer</EM></A>. <a href="http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/" target="_blank" >The MIT Press</A>, 1997. <LI>Elmar Wolfstetter: <a href="http://www.cup.org/titles/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521642280" target="_blank" ><EM>Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions and Incentives</EM></A>. <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/" target="_blank" >Cambridge University Press</A>, 1999. </LI></UL><P>差不多列出这方面的所有著作</P><P><a href="http://obata.misc.hit-u.ac.jp/~itoh/en/ref.html" target="_blank" >http://obata.misc.hit-u.ac.jp/~itoh/en/ref.html</A></P>
发表于 2005-8-8 16:38:00 | 显示全部楼层
<>大侠,有电子版吗,传上来多好!</P>
您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 立即注册

本版积分规则

关于我们|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋|人大经济论坛 ( 京ICP备05066828号-20 京公网安备 11040202430141号 )

GMT+8, 2020-1-30 00:31 , Processed in 0.052973 second(s), 28 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X3.4

© 2001-2017 Comsenz Inc.

快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表